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Book 'X 






LETTERS 



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MAJOR NORMAN PRINGLE, 

LATE OF THE 21st ROYAL SCOTS FUSILEERS, 
VINDICATING 

THE CHARACTER OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 

EMPLOYED IN NORTH AMERICA IN THE YEARS 1814-15, 

FROM ASPERSIONS CAST UPON IT 

IN 

STUART'S 
" THREE YEARS IN NORTH AMERICA." 



PRINTED FOR GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION, 
AND MAY BE HAD OF 

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, GEORGE STREET, EDINBURGH. 




LETTERS, &c. 
14t? 8 

LETTER I. 

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBRGH EVENING COURANT. 

Edinburgh, 29th October, 1833. 

Sir,— Having- within these few days read Mr Stuart's work on America, I was 
particularly struck with the manner in which the conduct of the British troops 
serving- under General Ross at the attack on Washington, is described. In vol. ii. 
p. 85, after commenting- upon the merits of the expedition, and lamenting the 
destruction of the Capitol, War Office, and the great bridge across the Potomac, Mr 
Stuart proceeds to say, pp. 86, 87, that the library, and a great part of the state 
papers, were destroyed. I shall here quote the author's own words:—" I heard 
many anecdotes of this much-to-be-regretted incursion. The commanders had 
directed private property to be respected, but it was impossible to restrain the soldiery. 
Much private property was destroyed. Mr Elliot was with the, army ; his house 
was sacked. The destruction of Mr Gales' printing establishment was the most 
pitiful of all the proceedings." Now, sir, I am desirous of putting the public in 
possession of a i'ew facts, which, I trust, will be the means of rescuing the character of 
the British soldiery from the imputation cast upon it. Subsequent to the defeat of the 
Americans at Bladensburg, General Ross advanced towards Washington with 1000 
men, and about eight o'clock in the evening arrived at an open piece of ground two 
miles from the Federal city. Soon after our arrival, I was informed by the adjutant 
of the regiment that General Ross wished to see me immediately. On coming to 
the General, I was informed by him that he had ordered the grenadier company of 
the 21st regiment to parade for a particular service, and that I was to command them, 
and about 39 men more, making in all 100 rank and lile. The General stated to me 
that he was about to advance into Washington, accompanied by this body of men 
only, who were to act as his advanced guard in approaching the city. That, on my 
arrival, I was to take up a position with my men, to place sentries at the different 
entrances into the city, to send patroles round every half hour, to prevent any soldier 
or seaman belonging to the expedition from entering the city, and on no account 
whatever to permit my men to go into any house. These orders were most punc- 
tually attended to. I went round with every patrole myself, I paraded my men every 
hour to see that none were absent, and for twelve hours held possession of the capital 
of the United States, with that handful of British soldiers, and preserved its peace. 

To one species of plunder I and many of my comrades must indeed plead guilty. 
The inhabitants of Washington, with becoming consideration, had provided an ample 
repast in every house for the conquering army, which was to return from Bladens- 
burg with the British in chains ; but, in its hurry to cross the Potomac, they swept 
past like its torrent, and left all the good things behind them. Then, indeed, there 
was a sad destruction of private property, — ducks, geese, hams, turkeys, buffalos' 
tongues, and butfalos' bumps, were devoured by wholesale ; nor was Mr Maddison's 
health forgotten, in his own best claret, for being so good a fellow as to leave us such a 
capital supper. This fell to the share of those who were employed in destroying the 
Capitol, &c. For myself and men, we were most kindly treated by an honest barber, 
who came to me in great distress, saying, that he had provided an excellent supper, 
but that he had no one to eat it. He accordingly brought us out ham and fowls, and 
various other good things, and he gave the men a quantity of bread and very good 
cider; and what remuneration did this excellent citizen demand for his kindness? 
Why, that I would allow one of my soldiers to remain in his house, to protect him 
against a set of rascals who were prowling about the city taking advantage of its 
distress. At eight o'clock, in the morning of the 25th, I was ordered to return to 



3 

the bivouac of the army, two miles distant from Washington ; and, previous to oar 
marching- off the men under my command had not only the satisfaction to receive 
the thanks of the ever-to-be-lamented General Ross, for the manner thev had pre- 
served the peace of the city, but my friend the barber, and a great many other 
inhabitants of Washington, thanked the General and the soldiers, for the protection 
they had afforded them from the marauding attacks of their own countrymen In 
adverting to what is said about the destruction of the great bridge across the Potomac 
1 have yet to learn, that a prudent military measure is contrary to the usages of war' 
particularly as the Americans themselves had destroyed the two bridges crossin- the 
eastern branch. ° 

I shall now, in corroboration of the facts which came under my own observation 
quote one or two remarks from American publications. The Columbian Centinel 
says, rhe British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peace- 
able citizen is molested." A writer from Baltimore, under date of 27th August 1814 
says « The enemy, I learn, treated the inhabitants of Washington well;"°and what 
says Mr Gales the mouth-piece of the Government, and the bitter enemy of the 
British ? « When we remarked," says he, « in our paper of yesterday, that private 
property had, in general, been respected by the enemy, we spoke what we believed • 
greater respect was certainly paid to private property than has usually been exhibited 
by the enemy in his marauding parties; no houses were half as much plundered by 
the enemy as by the knavish rogues about the town, who profited by the general 
distress. (National Intelligencer, 31st August.) I shall close my quotations with 
one from the George Town paper, 8th September: — " The list of plunder and 
destruction copied from a vile and libellous print of that city (Washington) into 
several Federal papers, is a gross and abominable fabrication, known to be such bit 
every inhabitant; most of the plunder was committed by rabble of the place fostered 
among the citizens, and subsequent to the departure of the British troops ; it is but 
justice to say, that the British army preserved moderation and discipline with 
respect to private property, unexampled in the annals of war." 

I have not sir, the honour of a personal acquaintance with Mr Stuart, the author 
of Three Years in North America." I trust he will forgive me for saying, that I 
think he has allowed himself to be imposed on by American mis-statements, in almost 
every instance, where the operations of the British army are described ; and that he 
will believe, I publish the above in no spirit of hostility towards him, but simply, as 
tar as in me lies, to put the character of my fellow-soldiers in a true light before the 
eyes of their countrymen, in justice to the memory of many brave men and valued 
tnends, and in justice to that army of which I was a member for nine-and-twenty 
years, and with which I served in almost every qnarter of the globe.— I have the 
honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant, 

Norman Pringle, 
Late Maj'or 21st Royal Scots Fusileers. 

LETTER II. 

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT. 

c , „ . ,. , 13th November, 1833. 

&ir, — In addressing this letter to you, I trust it will be found that I am actuated 
by no motive but that which I declared in my letter published in your paper of the 
81st ultimo, namely, the strong desire of doing justice, in every point of view, to the 
character of the British troops employed during the last American War. Mr Stuart 
says, in his letter to you, « I am therefore most culpable if even a single material 
error in this part of my work can be pointed out." Is it no material error to state 
mat the British soldiery could not be restrained from plundering- private property 
when there is direct evidence, both British and American, to shew that such an 
accusation is not correct ? Is it no material error to state that the British force at 
«ew Orleans was 12,000, and the American only 3000 or 4000 when the 
reverse is much nearer the truth, as official documents can shew ? Is it no material 
error roundly to assert that the British never reached the ditch, when there are many 
living witnesses to testify that they did, and when even American authority can 



be produced to shew that the British not only reached the ditcli but got into their 
lines ? 

I hope Mr Stuart will have the kindness to excuse me if I repeat, what, in charity 
to him, I continue to think, that he has allowed himself to be imposed on by Ameri- 
can mis-statements ; and if any reliance is to be placed on official documents, I believe 
I shall be enabled to shew that Mr Stuart hos had bad information respecting the 
British troops employed in the United States. 

Mr Stuart, in his letter to the Editors of the Courant and Caledonian Mercury, 
says, that I have impugned his statement regarding the behaviour of the British 
troops at Washington, i shall now beg leave again to call in question the correct- 
ness of his information, come from what source it may, and, in military phrase, break 
fresh ground with him, and t lie field shall be New Orleans. 

In vol. ii. page 253, of Mr Stuart's work, the author says, " The British are un- 
derstood to nave had between 10,000 and 12,000 men iu this engagement, and the 
Americans between 3000 and 4000." Now, sir, as I happen to have an official return 
of every regiment of the British army employed on that expedition, I shall give the 
list : Mr Stuart can refer to the Horse Guards to know if I am correct. The list 
is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines of New Orleans, on the 
morning of the 8th January, 1815: — 4th foot, 747; 7th do. 750; 21st do. 800; 43d 
do. 820; 44th do. 427; 85th do. 298; 93d do. 775; 95th do. 276 — making in all 
4893 rank and file British ; there remains to be added to this 200 seamen and 400 
marines. For the amount of the American force, I shall leave the public to draw 
the inference from Mr Stuart's own words, merely stating, that I have now before 
me a very beautiful plan of the operations, and of the American lines before New 
Orleans, executed by Major Lacarriere Latour, principal engineer, 7th military dis- 
trict, U. S. army, which lines, to use the Major's own expression, " were a mile in 
length, and filled with men." In vol. ii. page 252, Mr Stuart says, " General Jack- 
son placed his riflemen, each of whom had one, two, or three men behind him ;" and, 
again, he says, "the fire of the American militia was most unintermitting — (no 
wonder) — the men in some places ranged six deep." Now, sir, taking for granted 
that Major Latour's plan is most perfectly correct, and that Mr Stuart's information 
is in this instance good, I shall split the difference with him, and allow the Americans 
to have stood four deep, and each file at one yard distance from the other, (good 
elbow room, as every soldier will allow,) there being 1760 yards in a mile, will make 
the American force, by Mr Stuart's own account, amount to 7040. That the Ameri- 
cans had many more men is my firm belief, as General Jackson was much too skilful 
an officer to throw up lines a mile long, unless he had masses of men to fill them ; 
and I am sure I shall be borne out by my brother officers in saying, that such a tor- 
rent of fire (if I may so express it) as poured on the British troops that day along the 
whole extent of the line, was, perhaps, never witnessed, not even at St Sebastian. 
In page 253, Mr Stuart says, " the British never reached the ditch." I think I can 
easily disprove this assertion, and by American authority too. In consequence of an 
unfortunate mistake, the facines and ladders had never reached the head of our 
column. Major-Geueral Gibbs, leading on the attack at the head of the 21st 
regiment, finding that the facines were not forthcoming, ordered the two leading 
companies of the 21st regiment to move forward in double quick time under Major 
Whitaker, the senior Major of the regiment, for the purpose of making a lodgment 
in the ditch. Almost immediately on giving this order, General Gibbs was mortally 
wounded, and, at the same instant, the enemy commencing a destructive fire, our 
column was absolutely mowed down. The smoke was so great that we could not 
see our two companies which had been sent in advance : but those brave men, under 
their gallant leader, pressed on, got into the ditch, made stejis with their bayonets hi the 
parapet, and succeeded in getting into the American lines, where, from want of support, 
they were made prisoners. There are many of the officers still alive who can vouch 
for this fact. Major Whitaker was killed in climbing up the parapet. At the first 
burst of the fire from the American lines, Colonel, now Sir William Paterson of the 
21st, was badly wounded; Major Alexander James Ross was also most severely 
wounded, from the effects of which he never recovered, and died in Edinburgh some 
years after. 

The command of the 21st regiment devolved on the junior field officer. From the 
effects of the tremendous fire, the advancing column was for a moment thrown into 



confusion. The commanding officer of the regiment ordered a bugle to sound the 
advance, called to the men to follow him, which they did with cheers. They 
advanced to the ditch ; some of the men were already in it ; the present Lieutenant- 
General Sir John Keane, with that gallantry for which he is conspicuous, arrived, 
and, in the act of leading on and cheering the men, was badly wounded, and carried 
off the. field; at the same instant, a staff officer came up, and ordered the officer com- 
manding the 21st regiment to collect the remnant of his corps, and retreat to a wood 
in the rear. General Jackson in his despatch says, " Yet the columns of the enemy 
continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the highest credit. 
Twice the column which approached my left was repulsed, and twice they formed 
agaiu and renewed the assault:' (Assault of what ? why, of the ditch and parapet.) 
And now, sir, from my heart I thauk Mr Stuart for giving me an opportunity of pay- 
ing a tardy but just tribute to the memory of one of my earliest and most esteemed 
frfends — to one of the bravest soldiers that ever drew a sword — I mean the late 
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie of the 21st Scots Fusileers, nephew of the late 
Sir David Baird. This officer had been wounded severely in the knee at the attack 
on Washington, still more severely on lauding at the attack on Baltimore. Neither 
of these wounds were as yet healed, but nothing could prevent Rennie from per- 
forming his duty. Sir Edward Packenham had given Colonel Rennie a separate 
command, for the purpose of acting on the American right flank, and, as I am un- 
willing to make the public trust to the partial testimony of a friend, I shall forego 
the privilege, and recount the gallantry of Colonel Rennie in the words of his enemy, 
and I shall quote them from General Jackson's biographer, (Mr Eaton): — " Colonel 
Rennie, of the fusileers, was ordered to storm a redoubt on the American right. 
Rennie executed his orders with great bravery, and urging forward, arrived at the 
ditch, and reaching the works, and passing the ditch, Rennie, sword in hand, leaped 
on the wall, and calling to his troops, bade them follow him. He had scarcely 
spoken, when he fell by the fatal aim of one of our riflemen. Pressed by the 
impetuosity of superior numbers, who were mounting the walls, and entering at the 
embrasures, our troops had retired to the line in rear of the redoubt. To advance, 
or maintain the point gained, was equally impracticable for the enemy. The situa- 
tion of these brave fellows may be easily conceived. They were nearly all killed or 
taken prisoners." 

There is another circumstance connected with my gallant friend's death, which I 
cannot refrain from relating, as it gave me then, and does now give me, the greatest 
pleasure, to think that he was not only regretted by his friends, but that be, in his 
death, was honoured by his foes. The night previous to the action of the 8th of 
January, Rennie said to me, " I am always hit, and in case I should fall to-morrow, 
I beg you will use every endeavour to recover this ring, this brooch with some hair 
in it, and my watch, and if you survive, deliver them to my sister." After the 
attack on the lines of New Orleans had failed, a flag of truce was sent from Sir John 
Lambert to General Jackson. I wrote a few lines by the officer who carried it to 
the American general, mentioning my friendship for Colonel Rennie, and his request 
to me. On the return of the flag of truce, I received a polite message from General 
Jackson, saying that it gave him the greatest pleasure to comply with any request 
made by the friend of such a gallant soldier as Colonel Rennie — that he had taken 
care to protect his remains, and to order for them an honourable grave. The 
watch, ring, and brooch, were all returned to me. 

Accustomed as we had been for years to oppose an honourable and a courteous 
enemy, it was a green spot in the wilderness of American campaigning to find one 
of the same stamp in the present President of the United States. 

If, sir, I have expressed myself strongly, I have felt deeply. In that expedition I 
lost three of my earliest and most intimate friends, and there is a bond of affection 
between those who have stood by each other in many a well-fought field which men 
in ordinary life can hardly know. I have now to apologize to you and to the public 
for trespassing so long upon your time, but I hope you will both admit that it is a 
little too hard that men who are willing to suffer every privation, and to shed the 
last drop of their blood in the defence, or for the honour of their country, should 
have their " good name filched from them" by those who are (no disrespect to Mr 
Stuart) equally unwilling to allow and unable to appreciate their worth. I have 
J_!>p honour to be. sir, vour obedient servant, Norman Pringle, 



LETTER III. 

TO THE EDITOR OS" THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT. 

29th November, 1833. 

Sir, — In addressing' the following remarks to the public, I do not now come 
before it as merely wishing to defend the character of the British army from 
aspersions which have been cast upon it, and trust I have not infringed the rules of 
courtesy in not waiting longer for Mr Stuart's documents, but 1 wish to claim for 
that portion of the combined British forces employed in the expedition to New 
Orleans the merit they so well deserve. In the work already alluded to in letters 
published by me in the Edinburgh newspapers, where the author has thought it 
necessary to mention the failure of our attack on the lines of New Orleans, I was 
in hopes I might have found some description of other circumstances connected 
with that expedition, but I am sorry to say there is no page allotted to praise of the 
British seaman or British soldier in that work. Censure alone finds ample room. 
Why are the unparalleled exertions of our seamen and our soldiers withheld ? Why 
is the gallant action fought by Captain Lockyer near the pass of the Rigolets with 
the enemy's gun-boats — why is the capture of the whole of the American flotilla by 
that officer, with the boats of the British fleet, withheld ? Why is the action fought 
by our troops under Sir John Keane (under every disadvantage) withheld ? After 
being exposed to the most severe weather in open boats for nearly twenty-four hours, 
the troops landed on a shore unknown to them, — they had lain down to rest in 
their bivouac, when, in the darkness of the night, they were suddenly attacked by 
5000 Americans under General Jackson himself. (See Sir John Keane's despatch, 
December 28, 1814.) The British stood to their arms, repulsed the enemy at every 
point! and took up a position in advance of the one originally held ! The action 
fought by the troops and seamen under Colonel (now General) Thornton, and which 
action was completely successful, on the right bank of the Mississippi — why is this 
not mentioned? I shall take the liberty of doing so in General Jackson's own words, 
givenin his despatch of 9th January, 1815. The General says, " These" (meaning the 
British) " having lauded, were hardy enough to advance against the works of General 
Morgan ; and, what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when 
their entire discomfiture was looked for, the Kentucky reinforcements, in whom so 
much reliance had been placed, ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their 
example, the remainder of the forces, (about 1G00,) and thus yielding to the enemy 
that most formidable position." Well might the late Sir Alexander Cochrane say, 
in his despatch to -the Admiralty, dated January 18, 1815, " That the hardships 
undergone by the seamen and the troops had rarely been equalled." I will venture 
to assert, that in the whole annals of his own glorious service, that respected 
admiral never knew the combined energies of British seamen and British soldiers 
more severely put to the test. All were animated by the same enthusiasm. 
Officers and soldiers, admirals and seamen, were seen hauling on the same rope, and 
dragging at the same gun. It is not for British soldiers nor British sailors, any 
more than other mortals, to command success, but in this expedition they did 
deserve it. 

I shall now speak of the retreat of our troops from the American shores. It will 
be naturally supposed that we were harassed to a degree by the enemy, — that he 
followed up his victory in the lines by driving us before him, and sweeping us from 
the face of the earth. No, General Jackson knew better than to leave his strong- 
hold, — it was the prayer of every soldier that he would do so. The British lion 
had, indeed, been sorely stricken, but he was the lion still. Well has it been said 
by the eloquent author of the Peninsular War, " A British army may be gleaned, 
but it cannot be reaped." We remained until the 18th in our original position, and 
commenced our retreat on the evening of that day, — a retreat equally honourable 
to the general commanding, (Lieutenant-General Sir John Lambert,) and to the 
soldiers under him. 

It is easy for gentlemen to sit at home and criticise the operations of an army or 
the movements of a fleet, — they little know the ordeal to benasseder^ha^jctorv 



is won which may bring sorrow or rejoicing to their fireside. But the British 
puhlic may rest assured that its seamen and its soldiers are ever the same. On the 
shores of the Mediterranean as on the banks of the Mississippi, one feeling- alone 
animates them — the faithful discharge of their duty. " England expects every man 
to do his duty;" or the simple but characteristic appeal of the greatest Captain of 
any age — " What will they say in England?" these are signals British seamen 
and British soldiers will fly to answer. These are watch-words they will cheer to ! 
Look on the deck of the Victory ! look on the field of Corunna ! or on the green 
turf, the humble death-bed of the humblest soldier — one sentiment pervades them 
all. Listen to the last sob of the dying man, and in it you will find a whispered 
hope that he has done his duty ! It is also very easy for gentlemen, either in books 
or in House of Commons harangues, to send forth to the world systems hypotheti- 
cally got up for the proper management of British soldiers, to tell us that this 
punishment is right and that wrong. I will take leave to tell those gentlemen, they 
do not, they cannot know, the true character of a British soldier. They must have 
served with him for years — they must have studied the dispositions of individuals 
of the three countries from whence the British ranks are recruited — they must 
have feasted with him to-day, and fasted with him to-morrow — they must have 
dwelt with him in palaces, and couched with him in hovels — they must have 
stretched their limbs with him on the sands of Egypt, or in the swamps of 
Louisiana — they must have witnessed his utter contempt of all danger and hard- 
ship, his perfect devotedness to the cause in which he is embarked — they must 
have shared with him the triumph of victory or the mortification of defeat! Then, 
and not till then, can I admit them to be proper judges of the character of a British 
soldier. 

I shall conclude this communication, as I commenced my correspondence, by 
stating, that I have no motive but that of doing justice to my fellow-soldiers in 
every point of view. With whatever spirit of hostility I might have fought in 
1815, in 1833 I write with none. As I have before stated, we ever found in General 
Jackson an honourable and a courteous enemy, and all our prisoners were treated 
with kindness and generosity. I shall venture again to assure the author of 
" Three Years in North America," that he has been misled, and I would fain flatter 
myself that one day he will admit it. In the meantime our cause is before the 
public; to it I look for judgment, and with submission will await the verdict, 
whether for those who have made the charges, or for him who very humbly has 
offered the defence. 1 have the honour to he your obedient servant, 

Norman Pringle, 
Late Major 21st Scots Fusileers. 



LETTER IV. 

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT. 

January 24, 1834. 
Sir, — In answering portions of a pamphlet just published by Mr Stuart, purport- 
ing to be " A Refutation of Aspersions on Stuart's Three Years in America," I am 
afraid I shall be obliged to trouble you with more than one letter, but I shall make 
each as brief as circumstances will allow. In the first place, Mr Stuart says, that 
" if I had allowed his book to speak for itself, instead of giving my readers partial 
extracts from his narrative, it would have been hardly requisite for him to say a 
word in vindication of it." He farther states, that " the quotations are obviously 
extracted with a view to serve a purpose." Undoubtedly they were so, and the 
purpose was to contradict certain assertions made by Mr Stuart in his work, and 
which I have quoted in my letters already published; and why Mr Stuart blames me 
for not quoting more largely, I am really at a loss to understand. Mr Stuart's book 
was before the public, and those who wished to read it had the opportunity of doing 
so for months before the publication of my letters. In that book I found assertions 
derogatory to the character of that part of the British army with which I acted in 
America, and these assertions I contradicted. In page 12 of the Pamphlet, Mr Stuart 
" that t neither defend the proceedings at Washington, nor call in question the 



8 

propriety of his remarks — except in so far as concerns the private property destroyed 
by the soldiery, and the destruction of the bridge across the Potomac." Now, I did 
not profess to do more. With regard to the merit or demerit of the expedition to 
Washington I have nothing* to say. With regard to the burning and destroying 
public buildings, or what may have been considered public property, I have nothing 
to say. My sole object was to shew that Mr Stuart's statement was incorrect when 
he declared that the British soldiery could not be restrained from plundering at 
Washington. In my letter to you of the 29th of October, I stated that I was in 
command of a small force sent to Washington for the purpose of protecting private 
property ; that I remained in possession of the city from the evening of the 24th 
to the morning of the 25th, when I returned to the bivouac of the army, two miles 
from the city. I will again assert, that during my occupation of the city no private 
property was plundered by the soldiery. The army, with the exception of my small 
detachment, and those employed in the destruction of public buildings, was in 
bivouac two miles from the city, where it remained until the evening of the 25th. 
Page 14, " Mr Stuart says that my testimony comes no farther down than to eight 
o'clock of the morning of the 25th. It is, therefore, good for nothing. Every house 
in Washington might have been plundered between eight o'clock in the morning and 
the night of the 25th, when general Ross commenced retiring." If the plunder of 
private property did commence after my leaving the city, it must have done so under 
the eye of General Ross himself, which I think Mr Stuart will hardly venture to 
affirm. From what I know of the character of General Ross, I am convinced had 
any soldier been found plundering, or in any way molesting an unoffending citizen, 
in twelve hours he would have been shot, and the whole army must have known it. 
I beg Mr Stuart clearly to understand, that my orders from General Ross were to 
let no stragglers from the army on any condition enter Washington ; but I had 
nothing to do with detachments of men employed under the command of other 
officers in the destruction of public buildings, or what might have been considered 
public property. In page 13 of the Pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " Major Pringle 
Avould have us to believe, that he was omnipresent in a city above four miles long, 
and of very considerable breadth." 

This sounds very well, until we find that the city contained, at that time, about 
400 houses; and therefore I think it will be allowed, that 100 well disciplined 
British soldiers, under the immediate eye of their officers, could insure the safety of 
the inhabitants ; and that they did do so, I will again prove by American testimony. 
The Columbian Centinel of the 31st of August says, " The British officers pay inviol- 
able respect to private property, and no peaceable citizen is molested." A writer 
from Baltimore, under the date of August 29th, says, " The enemy, I learn, treated 
the inhabitants ; of Washington well." The George Town paper of 8th September 
jays, " The list of plunder and destruction, copied from a vile and libellous print of 
that city, (Washington,) into several Federal papers, is a gross and abominable 
falsification, known to be such by every inhabitant ? Most of the plunder was com- 
mitted by the rabble of the place fostered among the citizens. The British army, 
it is more than justice to say, preserved a moderation and discipline, with respect to 
private persons and property, unexampled in the annals of war." Mr Stuart com- 
plains of my unfairness in not quoting Mr Gales' whole paragraph. Mr Stuart is 
quite welcome to the full benefit of it all. Mr Gales says, " There were, however, 
several private buildings wantonly destroyed, and some of those persons who 
remained in the city were scandalously maltreated ;" and what evidence is there 
here that the " knavish rogues" Mr Gales already mentions were not the perpetra- 
tors of these scandalous proceedings ? as it is well known in such times every 
advantage is taken of the confusion and panic which reign. The latter paragraph 
of Mr Gales' remarks, regarding Admiral Cockburn, is beneath notice, for which, 
see Pamphlet, page 18. With respect to the destruction of the bridge, I again 
repeat, that it was a prudent military measure. A very small British force had 
penetrated a considerable distance into an enemy's country, they could not know 
from what quarter a large force might be brought against them. 

In page 24 of the Pamphlet are these words, " Major Pringle would have the 
world to believe that the British on all occasions respected private property." I 
Jiave read my former letters over, and I cannot find any expression in them which 
warrants this remark — I cannot plead guilty to such au absurdity. Mr Stuar^g[ocs__ 



on to say, " but it is hardly possible that he can be ignorant of all that was taking: 
place around him." Mr Stuart then carries me off bodily from Washington to 
Alexandria on the Potomac, to Captain Gordon and the Sea-horse, to 15,000 barrels 
of flour ! and 800 hogsheads of tobacco ! What has that to do with Mr Stuart's 
assertion that the British soldiery could not be restrained from plunder at Washing- 
ton. What impression does Mr Stuart suppose the world in general would have of 
an army whose soldiery could not be restrained from plunder? Why — that such an 
army had become an ungovernable rabble ; that the men had shaken off the restraint 
of discipline, and set at nought the authority of their officers ; that they had delivered 
themselves over to every species of enormity which an excited soldiery can commit. 
Does Mr Stuart mean to say, that this was the state of the army under General 
Ross, at Washington ? He cannot believe it, the public will not believe it. Mr 
Stuart accuses me of only quoting those parts of documents which suit my purpose. 
What does he think of the following specimen of his own candour ? In page 29 of 
the Pamphlet, he says, " Major Pringle cannot be ignorant that Sir Alexander 
Cochrane's celebrated communication to the American Government, announcing 
that it was his purpose to employ the force under his direction in ' destroying and 
laying waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable,' 
became a subject of a proclamation by the President of America." Mr Stuart has 
quoted part of Sir Alexander Cochrane's letter. I shall give the whole. " From 
Vice- Admiral Cochrane to Mr Munroe. — Sir, — Having been called on by the 
Governor-General of the Canadas to aid him in carrying into effect measures of 
retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States, for the wanton destruction 
committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my duty, 
conformably with the nature of the Governor-General's application, to issue to the 
naval force, under my command, an order to lay waste such towns and districts upon 
the coast as may be found assailable. I had hoped that this contest would have 
terminated without my being obliged to resort to severities which are contrary to 
the usages of civilized warfare ; and as it has been with extreme reluctance and 
concern that I have found myself compelled to adopt this system of devastation, I 
shall be equally gratified if the conduct of the executive of the United States will 
authorize my staying such proceedings, by making reparation to the suffering inha- 
bitants of Upper Canada; thereby manifesting, that if the destructive measures 
pursued by this army were ever sanctioned, they will no longer be permitted by the 
Government. I have the honour," &c. 

In Mr Stuart's book, page 87 of volume second, he mentions the following circum- 
stance :— He says, " They (the Americans) were not at the time aware that it was to 
Sir George Cockburn they were indebted for the visit of the British to Washington ; 
and it was upon the brave and amiable General Ross, who afterwards fell in the 
attack upon Baltimore, that they intended to retaliate for the devastation at Wash- 
ington ! It was resolved to send a fast sailing armed vessel to the coast of Ireland, 
to destroy Ross Trevor, the beautiful property belonging to General Ross. A party 
were to land in the night at the entrance of Carlingford Bay ; they were to burn 
the house upon the mountain, and the village below. The peace put an end to this 
design, which was, however, seriously entertained." Indeed ! Magnanimous resolu- 
tion of this brave and generous nation ! A set of men were to cross the Atlantic 
with all the malice prepense of premeditated marauders and incendiaries, for the pur- 
pose of attacking the property of an unoffending and defenceless woman, whose 
husband, by the time this design could have been put in execution, had fallen, in the hour 
of victory, and with his last breath had recommended " a young unprovided family 
to the protection of his king and country." See Colonel Brookes' despatch after 
the action before Baltimore. I trust that it is unnecessary for me to tell Mr Stuart 
that I do not quote this passage as receiving from him countenance or support in any 
way. I am quite sure that he is as incapable as any man alive of receiving it in any 
other light than that of unqualified detestation ; but let us hear no more of these 
sticklers for the " usages of civilized warfare." I have the honour to be, sir, your 
obliged humble servant, Norman Pringle, 

Late Major 21st Foot. 



10 



LETTER V. 

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT. 

Edinburgh, 25th January, 1 834. 
Sir, — Having now answered Mr Stuart's objections to my statement regarding 
Washington, I proceed to defend the accuracy of those I made respecting the attack 
on the lines of New Orleans. In page 32 of Mr Stuart's Pamphlet, he says, " It is 
not by the perusal of garbled and partial extracts from my work on the documentary 
evidence which supports it that my statements are to be judged of." I have already 
said, that in Mr Stuart's work I found statements regarding the British army serving 
in the United States which I did not think correct, and I quoted those passages for 
the purpose of bringing thera before the public and refuting them. In page 48 of 
the Pamphlet, with reference to my list of the number of British troops engaged on 
the 8th of January, on the attack of the lines before New Orleans, are these words, 
" I confess that the Hist perusal of the very distinct testimony thus afforded by a 
gentleman who, upon the occasion to which his evidence relates, was himself acting 
as a held officer, startled me, and led me to think that I must have relied on defective 
information; but upon again consulting the official documents to which I had 
recourse in writing this first part of my work, I am glad to be able to prove that it is 
Major Pringle who is in error, and that my information was not only correct, but is 
supported by a mass of authorities." For the remainder, see Pamphlet, page 49. In 
my letter to you, sir, of the 13th November, 1833, I mention that I have an official 
return of every regiment employed on the expedition to New Orleans. I then stated 
that the list I gave is of British infantry employed in the attack on the lines at New 
Orleans, on the morning of the 8th of January. Then follows a list of the regiments 
employed in the attack, making 4893 rank and file British. There remains to be 
added to this 200 seamen and 400 marines. See my two letters. In page 50 of the 
Pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " Nothing is better known to a military man than that 
the rank and file of a regiment, or of an army, comprehend merely the men armed 
with the bayonet, and that the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, the 
staff of the army, military as well as medical, the drum-major, drummers, pipers, &c. 
are not comprehended under that description. This is a serious objection to Major 
Pringle's detailed and conclusive information, as it is termed by you ; but it is a 
slight objection, compared with those which are to follow." Sir, in giving a list of 
the British infantry employed on the attack of the lines before New Orleans, I, as a 
matter of course, designate them as rank and file, being, what I believe every military 
man will allow, the fighting part of a regiment. It may be a startling proposition to 
the author of " Three Years in North America" to hear an old campaigner declare that 
he does not consider the officers a fighting part of a regiment, aud that any officer who 
goes into action determined to fight with his own proper hand, is not fit for the 
situation he holds; it is his duty to pay exclusive attention to his men, to see that 
they are so held in hand, as to be enabled promptly to obey any orders he may require 
to give, emanating from himself or from his superior officer. The duty of the Serjeants 
is the same ; and in my day they were armed with a halbert, which, against an enemy 
carrying muskets, could not be considered a very offensive weapon. It certainly 
would be new to me, to include medical men with their lancets, or musicians with 
their clarionets, in the list of fighting men. I have always understood it to be the 
duty of the one to carry off the wounded, and of the other to attend them. The only 
error I have committed is in placing the 85th regiment in the list of British infantry 
employed in the attack of the lines before New Orleans; this admirable corps was 
under the immediate command of their own most distinguished commanding officer, 
Colonel Thornton, on the other side of the Mississippi. 1 have, by including them 
in my list, made the amount of British infantry attacking the lines greater, by 298 
rank and file, (the strength of the 85th,) than it ought to be. 

I now proceed, sir, to give a list of the killed and wounded in every corps em- 
ployed on both sides of the river on the 8th of January, to shew what regiments 
bore the brunt of the action. On that day — 4th foot, 1 ensign, 2 Serjeants, 39 rank 

and file killed : 1 lipiltpnont.rnlrtnpl. 1 wainr 5 rantnins 11 lipntonants. 4 nnshm: — 



11 

1 staff, 9 Serjeants, '222 rank and rile wounded; 1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 53 rank and 
rile missing-. 1th foot reserve, 1 major, 1 captain, 1 serjeant, 38 rank and file killed ; 

2 captains, 2 lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 47 rank and file wounded. 21st foot — 1 major, 
1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, 65 rank and file killed ; 1 lieutenant-colonel, 
1 major, 2 lieutenants, 6 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 144 rank and file wounded ; 2 captains, 
7 lieutenants, 8 Serjeants, 2 drummers, 217 rank and file missing, taken prisoners 
inside the American lines. 43d foot reserve — 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 8 rank and 
file killed; 2 lieutenants, 3 Serjeants, 3 drummers, 34 rank and file wounded; 

1 captain, 5 rank and file missing - . 44th foot — 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 
32 rank and file killed ; 1 captain, 5 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 5 Serjeants, 149 rank 
and tile wounded ; 1 lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 76 rank and file missing-. 
85th foot, on the right bank of the river — 2 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant- 
colonel, 1 lieutenant, 3 Serjeants, 2 drummers, 34 rank and file wounded ; 1 rank 
and file missing. 93d foot — 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 captains, 2 Serjeants, 58 rank 
and file killed; 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 17 Serjeants, 3 drummers, 348 rank and 
file wounded ; 3 lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 99 rank and file missing. 
95th foot — 1 serjeant, 10 rank and file killed ; 2 captains, 5 lieutenants, 5 Serjeants, 
89 rank and file wounded. Royal marines — 2 rank and file killed; 1 captain, 

2 lieutenants, 1 serjeant, 12 rank and tile wounded. Royal navy — 2 seamen killed; 
1 captain, 18 seamen wounded. 1st West India regiment — 5 rank and file killed; 
1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 2 Serjeants, 16 rank and file wounded; 1 rank 
and file missing. 5th West India regiment — 1 serjeant wounded. Royal Artillery, 
on both sides — 5 rank and file killed ; 10 rank and tile wounded. Royal engineers, 
sappers and miners — 3 rank and file wounded. The 14th dragoons are not men- 
tioned in the list, they having none either killed or wounded. That Sir John 
Lamhert thanked the officers commanding the Royal Artillery, the 14th dragoons, 
the West India regiments, the sappers and miners, the seamen and marines, — that 
he thanked every individual belonging to all these corps, for the manner in which 
every duty, of whatever kind, had bean performed by them ; for " an assiduity" (I 
quote the General's own words) " and perseverance, beyond all example, by all ranks, 
and the most hearty co-operation which existed between two services," is well 
known to me. But I wish to ask the author of " Three Years in North America," 
of what use would dragoons have been in an attack on lines situated in very wet 
ground, with a parapet of great height, and a deep ditch into the bargain ? — of what 
use would artillery have been in an action where the troops were to march as fast 
as consisted with good order, to the attack of lines where they were immediately to 
come ii] close contact with their enemy? — Would it not have been an equal chance 
whether they destroyed friend or foe ? The same holds good with respect to 
sappers and miners, as far as regards an attacking force against the lines of New 
Orleans. The list in my second letter is of British infantry employed in the attack 
of the lines of New Orleans ; the above list of killed and wounded will shew that 
my statement as to the attacking force is correct. On both sides of the river the 
force ready for action was about 7300. Colonel Thornton had of that number 298 
rank and tile of the 85th regiment, 600 seamen and marines, the 5th West India 
regiment, which Mr Stuart says " he believes was the strongest that landed on the 
shores of Louisiana," and 4 pieces of artillery ; and if the whole British army had 
been on the right bank of the Mississippi, I could not have included it as being a part 
of the force which attacked the lines in front of New Orleans. I of course cannot 
prove by any well authenticated account the precise amount of the American force 
within the lines of New Orleans; and if I were to take the reports of Mr Ducros, 
and other American prisoners, I .night give their statement that there were 13,000 
or 14,000 troops within the city of New Orleans; but I do not wish to avail myself 
of testimony which might have been given with a view to intimidate, by ex- 
aggerating the force we had to encounter. I shall now endeavour to prove that 
General Jackson's lines were about a mile long, and that they were tilled with men. 
I have no hesitation in saying that I take the authority of Major Latour as the 
very best which can be had ; he was the engineer officer who constructed the lines, 
and must have been perfectly acquainted with their extent. He must have known 
to a yard what it really was, and I have already said that General Jackson was 
much too skilful an officer to construct such lines unless he had men to till them, 

s it is obvious to common sense that in as much as defences ore extensive, so do 



12 

they become weak, if not guarded by troops within them. In page 59 of the pamphlet, 
Mr Stuart says, " Latour's calculation of the length of his line, may perhaps be 
explained by a statement of Levasseur, though, if his explanation be correct, it will 
not redound to the candour of Major Pringle, who, having accompanied the army, 
could not fail to know the real state of the case. Levasseur's information, how- 
ever, is probably correct, for he mentions that the details were given to him on the 
spot, and that he was possessed of Latour's memoirs." " The position (he writes) 
chosen by the American General to wait for reinforcements, and to arrest the 
advance of so formidable an enemy, appeared to me judicious. He threw up 
intrenchments about five miles below the city, along an old canal, the left of which 
was lost in the depths of a swampy wood, whilst the right rested on the river. The 
total length of the line wa< about eight hundred toises, but as three hundred toises 
up the left were unassailable, the enemy was confined in his attack to a front of 
about five hundred toises, and obliged to advance in full view over a perfectly level 
plain." See Pamphlet, page 60, for the latter part of this paragraph, in which Mr 
Stuart mentions a toise to be two yards. 

Now, sir, I shall proceed to shew that the swawp or wooded marsh towards the 
left of the American lines, and in front of them, was not impassable. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Reunie, of the 21st regiment, having himself reconnoitered the wood, 
made a report to General Gibbs, ottering to conduct a body of troops through it. 
General Gibbs no sooner heard Colonel Rennie's report, than he accompanied him 
to the Commander of the forces, Sir E. Packenham. The consequence was, that, 
on the 28th of December, a demonstration of the whole army was ordered, and 
Colonel Rennie, in command of his own light company of the 21st regiment, was 
ordered to penetrate into the wood, as far as he could, and gain the enemy's left. 
He executed his orders in the most admirable manner, succeeded in getting the 
whole of his men through, and debouched from the wood upon the American left. 
According to the orders he had received, he kept up a brisk tire until he was 
desired to retire. Sir Edward Packenham, not thinking himself authorized to 
attack such strong lines with his very small force, withdrew his troops, determined 
to wait the arrival of the 7th and 43d regiments, which reached us on the 6th of 
January. On the 8th of January, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 4th regiment, 
was put in command of a body of troops, I believe about 400, to make his way 
through the wood and gain the enemy's left flank ; in fact, to pursue the route, as 
nearly as possible, which Colonel Rennie had done on the 28th. Colonel Jones 
succeeded, as Colonel Rennie had done, in conducting his force through the swamp, 
debouched at the same spot, but found the line of defence in a very different con- 
dition from what it had been on the 28th. The enemy having now found, that 
what they had considered (previous to the demonstration) an impassable morass, 
was no hindrance to our troops; had, between the 28th of December and the 8th 
of January so fortified this, the left of their line, as to make it perhaps the most 
formidable of their whole position. Colonel Jones fell, mortally wounded, gallantly 
leading on his men, composed of detachments of the 4th, or King's Own, 21st 
regiment, and 95th rifles; but no effort of his troops could surmount the difficulties 
opposed to them of a high parapet, deep ditch, and skilful riflemen to defend them. 
I here subjoin the copy of a letter which I have received within these few days from 
Lieutenant-Colonel the honourable James Sinclair, at that time an officer in the 
21st regiment, and who accompanied Colonel Rennie with the light company of 
the 21st regiment during the demonstration on the 28th of December, and also was 
attached to" the 400 men under Colonel Jones of the 4th on the 8th of January :— 

" Edinburgh, January 27, 1834. 
" My Dear Pringle, — On the evening of the 27th of December, our ever to be 
lamented friend, Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie, in whose company I was, received 
orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed with his own company, and endea- 
vour to make his way through the wood, and turn the enemy's left. Accordingly, 
on the morning of the 28th we proceeded, and entered the wood, and made our way 
with some difficulty, owing to the thickness of the wood and swampy ground. We 
kept still moving forward cautiously, until we heard two shots, and saw two of our 
advance fall, on which we dashed on, and found ourselves among some huts, which 
wvsjia. o^ciujiecl.-h" >b» o.n/nnv. Wp continued to pychanfe for some time a .nrejtjL. 



13 

hot fire. Colonel Rennie, perceiving that the firing of our guns on his left had 
ceased, (the signal for him to retire,) commenced his retreat slowly, bringing our 
wounded with us. We got hack nearly the same way as we advanced, and returned 
with the main body to the camp. On the morning of the 8th of January, I was 
ordered with the light company of the 21st to join a brigade of between 400 or 500 
men — the whole under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. We were ordered 
to proceed in the same manner and to the same place we had got to before. After 
pushing through the wood, with great difficulty, we approached that part of the 
enemy's line we formerly found unprotected. A tremendous fire of grape and 
musketry was opened on us, which killed and wounded a great many men, and we 
found, with all our efforts, that on this part of the line it was impossible to make 
any impression. Jones was wounded towards the enemy's extreme left, when 
cheering on his men. We remained under fire a considerable time, and made 
several vaiu attempts to get over, when a staff officer came up, and ordered us to 
retire into the wood. From the moment we came out of the wood, in our advance, 
the whole of the American line from right to left seemed one sheet of fire, and it 
never ceased for an instant : as far as I could see, the men appeared to be in crowds. 
I have always understood that the American lines in front of New Orleans were 
towards a mile in length. Yours, with much regard, 

(Signed) " Jas. Sinclair, 

Major, H. P." 

I have, sir, already taken notice, at page 59 of the Pamphlet, where Mr Stuart 
gives the information of Levasseur as being probably correct. We find in this 
quotation, that Levasseur says, " The length of this line was about eight hundred 
toises, but as three hundred toises of the left were unassailable, the enemy was 
confined in his attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and obliged to advance 
in full view over a perfectly level plain." 

I have shewn, sir, by the above letter from an officer who accompanied not only 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rennie on the day of his reconnoisance, but formed, with the 
company to which he belonged, part of the force sent to attack the enemy's left on 
the morning of the 8th, that it was not necessary for the British " to contine their 
attack to a front of about five hundred toises, and l>e obliged to advance in full 
view over a perfectly level plain ;" that I have proved that a considerable force, 
under Colonel Jones, did advance under cover of the wood, passed through it, and 
arrived at that part of the enemy's line which, previous to the 28th December, was 
considered by Levasseur and the Americans as unassailable, but which, on the 8th 
of January, was attacked by the force under Colonel Jones, and found to be full of 
men, and as strong as any other part of the position. I therefore say, that the 
American line of defence before New Orleans was, by Levasseur's own words, (Mr 
Stuart's authority,) eight hundred toises, or sixteen hundred yards, the three hundred 
toises not being unassailable, as found by the attack under Colonel Jones. Thus 
making-, after all, Levasseur's measurement within 160 yards of Major Latour's, 
with this difference, that Mr Stuart says, page 59, that " Levasseur's information is 
probably correct." 

With respect to the number of men composing the American force within the 
lines, I, of course, can have no certain mode of calculation ; but convinced, as I have 
always been, from every authority I could obtain, that the American lines were 
towards a mile long, and considering that General Jackson could not know in what 
quarter of his line he was to be attacked, it was necessary for him to be equally 
prepared at every point; and as Mr Stuart has allowed in his book, page 292, that 
the Americans " ranged in some places six deep," I have a right to assume that, as 
the nature of the ground was nearly the same on which the lines were formed, so 
was it necessary to have them equally well lined with men ; and since Mr Stuart 
rejects my former calculation, I will abide by his. He says, " six deep in some 
places ;" they might have been, eight in others ; it does not at all follow that the files 
are to melt away to suit a particular purpose, there they stand six deep ; and giving 
up even the odd hundred and sixty yards between Levasseur and Latour, six time's 
sixteen hundred will come to more than my former calculation. I have always 
understood from officers present at that action, and who had gone through the 
Peninsular war, (therefore no bad judges,) that from the extent of the line, and the 



14 

tremendous fire kept up, the Americans must have had from eight to ten thousand 
men within it. I now, sir, come to that part of" Three Years in North America," 
where the author says, the British never reached the ditch. At page 258, are these 
words, " The British never reached the ditch ;" and in page 61 of the Pamphlet, the 
author says, " It is obvious to every one who reads my narrative with attention, 
that it is only by a forced construction, that it can be held to maintain that the 
British in no part of the action reached the ditch." The second paragraph, detail- 
ing Sir Edward PackenhanCs attack, contains no such impression. Is is in the third 
which relates to the continuation of the attack by Generals Gibbs and Keane, that 
the assertion is contained, that the British did not reach the ditch. Now, sir, any 
one acquainted with the details of the action before New Orleans, is aware, that our 
most gallant Commander-in-Chief lost his life in an early part of the action, and 
before it was almost possible that the men could have reached the ditch ; and it was 
when he was in front of the men, cheering them on, that he lost his valuable life. 
Subsequent to his death, owing to the example and exertion of General Gibbs, the 
column which he headed, and where he Jell, were brought up to the ditch, the two 
leading companies of the 21st regiment, under Major Whittaker got into the ditch, 
and were taken prisoners inside the lines. The individual who now addresses you, 
with the remainder of the 21st regiment, was close to the ditch, some of his men 
were in it, when General Sir John Keane came up encouraging the men, but almost 
instantly fell, severely wounded, at the same moment a staff officer arrived, and 
ordered the officer commanding the 21st regiment to retire with his men. See my 
second letter. I have thus shewn, sir, that the author of " Three Years in North 
America" has been misinformed even with respect to the period of the action at 
which the British did reach the ditch ; but he has distinctly slated, in page 258, that 
the British never reached the ditch. He now says, indeed, that he never meant to 
deny that a few rash men did reach the ditch. Does Mr Stuart mean to say that 
two companies of the 21st regiment, with all the officers that belonged to them, 
were only a few rash men ? General Jackson states, in his despatch, that he took 
500 prisoners. It is notorious to every one, that the Americans were never 
on the outside of their lines. And were these prisoners then, in Mr Stuart's esti- 
mation, only a few rash men ? I leave the public to judge of the word never. At 
page CO of the pamphlet, Mr Stuart says, " I find myself charged with not having 
thought it necessary, in noticing the failure of the attack on the lines at New 
Orleans, to give any description of other incidents connected with the expedition." 
Mr Stuart is quite right ; I ought not to have expected that he would take notice of 
the actions I mention, as he very probably never heard of them; they were success- 
ful, and it is not likely the Americans would dwell much on British victories. At 
page 43, Mr Stuart says, " If I had been inclined to accuse the British army of 
plundering, without ever considering the evidence on which such charges rested, I 
might have stated, that the Duke of Saxe Weimar expressly mentions, that the 
British carried off the cattle, and above 60 negroes from j&eneral Villaret. But as I 
did not find this fact stated in the American official accounts, I omitted all notice of 
it," I do not, sir, attempt to contradict this statement, it may be quite true or it may 
not. I certainly saw many negroes in our camp; but whether they were brought 
there by force, or whether they escaped from their masters, I cannot pretend to say. 
With regard to the bullocks, I can affirm they did not come my way ; but from 
some passages I have read in " Three Years in North America," with respect to 
good dinners, if the author had been as long eating salt junk and hard biscuit as we 
had, I suspect he would have enjoyed a fresh beef steak, and not have been very 
particular in his inquiries from whence it came. At page 68, 69 of the pamphlet, 
Mr Stuart says, " Sir John Keane's action with General Jackson, to which Major 
Pringle particularly alludes, was fought during the night of the 22d December. 
Major Pringle, it will be seen, describes the British as suddenly attacked in the 
darkness of the night, by five thousand Americans, who were repulsed at every 
point, the British taking up a position in advance of the one originally held. Sir 
J. Keane's account of this action, is, however, very different." Now, Sir, I copy the 
following passages from Sir J. Keane's despatch : — " At about eight o'clock in the 
evening, when the men, much fatigued by the length of time they had been in the 
boats, were asleep in their bivouac, a heavy slanting fire of round and grape was 
opened upon them, by a large schooner, and two war vessels which had dropped 



15 

down the river from the town, and anchored ahreast of our fires, &c. A most 
vigorous attack was then made on the advanced front and right flank piquets, the 
former of the 95th, under Captain Hatton, the latter, 85th, under Captain Schaw ; 
these officers, and their respective piquets, conducted themselves with firmness, and 
checked the enemy for a considerable time, but renewing 1 their attack with a large 
force, and pressing at these points, Colonel Thornton judged it necessary to move 
up the remainder of both corps. The 85th regiment was commanded by Brevet- 
Major Gibbons, whose conduct cannot be too much commended; on the approach of 
his regiment to the point of attack, the enemy, favoured by the darkness of the 
night, concealed themselves behind a high fence which separated the fields, and 
calling to the men as friends, under pretence of being part of our own force, offered 
to assist them in getting over, which was no sooner accomplished, than the 85th 
found itself in the midst of very superior numbers, who discovering themselves, 
called on the regiment immediately to surrender — the answer was an instantaneous 
attack. A more extraordinary conflict has perhaps never occurred, absolutely hand 
to hand with officers and men ; it terminated in the repulse of the enemy, with the 
capture of 30 prisoners. A similar finesse was attempted with the 95th regiment, 
which met the same treatment. The enemy finding his reiterated attacks were 
repulsed by Colonel Thornton, at half past ten advanced a large column against our 
centre. Perceiving his intention, I directed Colonel Stovin to order Lieut.-Colonel 
Dale, with 130 men of the 93d regiment, who had just reached the camps, to move 
forward and use the bayonet, holding the 4th regiment in hand formed in line, as my 
last reserve. Colonel Dale endeavoured to execute his orders, but the crafty enemy 
would not meet him ; seeing the steadiness of his small body, gave it a heavy fire, 
and quickly retired. Colonel Brooke, with four companies of the 21st regiment, 
fortunately appeared at that moment on our right flank, and sufficiently secured it 
from farther attack. The enemy now determined on making a last effort, and, col- 
lecting the whole of his force, formed an extensive line, and moved directly against 
the light brigade. At first, this line drove in all the advanced posts; but Colonel 
Thornton, whose noble exertions had guaranteed all former success, Avas at hand ; 
he rallied his brave comrades round him, and moving forward, with a firm determi- 
nation of charging, appalled the enemy, who, from the lesson he had received on the 
same ground in the early part of the evening, thought it prudent to retire, and did 
not again dare to advance. It was now twelve o'clock, and the firing ceased on 
both sides. From Ike best information I can obtain, the enemy's force amounted to 
5000 men, and was commanded by General Jackson himself. Judging from the 
number left on the field, his loss must have been severe." 

I may now ask in what my account of this action differs from that of Sir John 
Keane, except that I do not enter so minutely into detail, nor bestow the same 
commendation on the troops who fought it, and " repulsed the enemy at ever?/ 
point" 

I am far, sir, from wishing to detract from the merit the Americans deserve, for 
the manner they defended their country ; and if the commendation of an individual, 
much behind General Jackson in experience and military rank, can be at all 
acceptable to him, I can have no hesitation in saying, that his position at New 
Orleans shewed consummate judgment, and the manner in which he was seconded 
w-n- 6 defence of the lines tllere > reflects the highest credit on the troops under him. 
Willing as I am to allow what I have now written, I cannot abate one iota of the 
eulogium, however ungrateful to some ears, I formerly passed on the soldiers of my 
own country; nor will I admit, that any expression I made use of in that eulogium, 
will be cavilled at by those whose opinion I value. I think, sir, I may venture to 
say that I have shewn Mr Stuart has failed to prove that " the British soldiery 
could not be restrained from plunder at Washington;" that I have proved my 
account of the British force employed in the attack on the lines in front of New Orleans 
to be substantially correct ; that I have proved my estimate of the length of the lines 
to be supported by the best authority, — the officer who constructed them ; and that 
my inference deduced from that, with regard to the American numbers, is not an 
unfair one ; and that I have proved, even by Mr Stuart's own admission, that " the 
British did reach the ditch." 

I shall now advert to page 42 of the pamphlet, where Mr Stuart writes these 
words: "Moreover, he (Major Pringle) has not scrupled to make it a public 



16 




>.. 



complaint, ' that men who are willing' to suffer every privation, and to shed the last 
drop of their blood in the defence, or for the honour, of their country, should have 
their o-ood name filched from them by those who are equally unwilling to allow, 
and unable to appreciate, their worth.' These are heavy charges ; affecting- as they 
do, not onlv the credit of the work, but the character of the writer in point of 
veracity, intelligence, and good feeling." Sir, I never made such charges against 
Mr Stuart; I never questioned his " veracity, intelligence, and good feeling." I 
knew too well what was due to his feelings, and to my own character ; and if Mr 
Stuart had done me the justice to quote the latter part of my letter, as it was 
written, this explanation would not have been necessary. Let him turn to his own 
Pamphlet, in which my letter is published, and he will find the passage thus 
expressed, — " should have their good name ' filched from them ' by those who are 
(no disrespect to Mr Stuart) equally unwilling to allow, and unable to appreciate, 
their worth." It was my firm conviction that Mr Stuart had received his intelli- 
gence from persons not capable of giving him correct information on several points 
stated in his work. To those persons alone were my observations directed ; and 
that no mistake might occur on this point, I inserted the words, " no disrespect 
to Mr Stuart," of which he has taken no notice. 

Thus, sir, I have fully proved, in two letters, that my objections to certain 
passages in the work " Three Years in North America," (and which related to the 
operations of that part of the British army with which I served in the United States) 
were well founded, and that a pamphlet lately published by the author of " Three 
Years in North America," the materials for which he has taken nearly three months 
to collect, is no refutation at all. To characterize this pamphlet, I cannot do it in 
fewer words than by making use of the somewhat trite quotation, " Parturiunt monies, 
nascitur ridieulus 7nus." I have now, sir, trespassed long on your time, and that of 
the public. I trust the anxiety I ba?e felt that the character of British soldiers 
should be put in a true light before the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, will plead 
my excuse, and though now no longer one of them, I. must confess myself their 
very inadequate, but zealous advocate. — I have the honour to be, sir, your obliged 

humble servant, _ 

Norman Pringlis, 

Late Major 21st Regiment. 



EDINBURGH!: 
Printed by Andrew Shortrede, Thistle Lane. 






